estoppl is the control and evidence layer for AI agents. A drop-in proxy that puts hard limits on what your agent can do and signs a tamper-evident record of what it did. Answer “what can it do?” with a policy instead of a promise, and “what did it do?” with proof their reviewer verifies in 30 seconds.
One config change. Zero code rewrites. Named-field redaction strips sensitive arguments at the proxy, before anything syncs.
And over half of vendors report losing deals to security reviews they couldn't clear in time. Bank and insurer third-party risk teams now ask agent vendors three questions, and today the honest answer to all three is a diagram and a promise.
An architecture diagram and a scope paragraph in the MSA.
Application logs we control, in a format nobody can verify.
A promise that we will produce something if asked.
SOC 2 and ISO 42001 attest a company's processes, annually. Nothing attests an agent’s runtime behavior, continuously.
That gap is why deals stall for months on questions no existing artifact answers. Cloud platforms log what their own tenants' agents do, for their own dashboards. Certifications attest your processes, once a year. Nobody attests the vendor's agent to the buyer. That's the artifact the review is waiting for.
estoppl sits between your agent and the tools it calls. Every action is intercepted, evaluated against policy, signed, and hash-chained, then packaged as evidence your customer’s reviewer can verify without trusting you or us.
Configurable field redaction keeps named sensitive fields out of the record. Verification runs against a published JWKS. No estoppl account and no trust in our cloud at verification time.
One file you attach to the security review. Their reviewer opens it, checks the signature independently, and gets an answer to all three questions without a call, a portal login, or another round of emails with your solutions engineer. The next review gets a current packet, not last quarter’s. The recording never stopped.
Allow-lists, spend thresholds, rate limits, and human-review gates. Attested as the configuration that was actually loaded, not the one described in a diagram.
Every tool call, its policy decision, and its outcome, Ed25519-signed and hash-chained, so a single altered or deleted record breaks the chain visibly.
The runtime record lined up against the AI and agent-oversight sections reviewers are working from, so answers cite evidence instead of prose.
Reissued continuously while the proxy is recording. Stop instrumenting and it stops being current, because a runtime log cannot be backfilled. Ed25519-signed, verifiable offline against a published JWKS. No account, no portal, no trust in our cloud at verification time.
A live packet from a demo deployer, signed an hour ago and reissued continuously. Verify the signature in your browser and watch the chain check out. Three views, in the vocabulary of the three people who tend to run the review.
Reviewers have read enough policy documents. Every control below is enforced in the request path and evidenced in the signed log, the same record the packet is built from.
Allow-lists, block-lists, amount thresholds, rate limits, and conditional rules on any field. Per-agent overrides. This is the answer to “what can it do?”
High-risk tool calls pause until a human approves or denies via email, Slack, webhook, or dashboard. The gate, and who cleared it, are both in the record.
Every tool call Ed25519-signed and hash-chained. Tamper-evident by construction. This is the answer to “what did it do?”
Block a tool or shut down an agent from the dashboard. Every proxy picks up the change within 5 seconds. That is the containment story reviewers ask for.
Every forwarded request carries an X-Estoppl-Attestation header, so upstream servers can verify governance before they process the call.
Every agent and every deployment in one view. Event feeds, decision badges, request inspection, and the exports your customer asked for.

estoppl intercepting Stripe MCP tool calls in Cursor, blocking a $50,000 invoice from the cloud dashboard, and writing every action to a signed audit trail. Three minutes, no slides.
The review bar moved. The artifacts didn't.
of organizations can’t distinguish agent activity from human activity.
Agent deployments are outrunning the ability to supervise them. Reviewers know it, which is why the questions got harder this year.
carriers moved to exclude AI risk after ISO’s January 2026 exclusion forms.
The exclusions began in 2024 and went industry-wide this year. The AI-specific policies replacing them condition coverage on documented governance evidence.
enterprise AI questionnaires added agent-oversight sections.
Point-in-time certifications answer them once a year, at the process level. No standard exists for continuous runtime evidence, which is the opening.
Figures: CSA/Aembit identity survey (March 2026); ISO GenAI exclusion endorsements and carrier filings (2024–26); SIG 2026 and CSA AI-CAIQ questionnaire updates; vendor security-review surveys (2025–26). Full citations on request.
The buyer is the vendor with revenue stuck behind a security review. The verifier is their customer. Both sides get the same artifact, which is the point.
“Our customer’s compliance team wants evidence covering our agent’s tool calls that fits their SEC 17a-4 / FINRA 4511 recordkeeping arrangements. SOC 2 and ISO 42001 don’t cut it. The deal has been in review for two months.”
Standing Certificate ships with the enterprise quote. Continuous tamper-evident audit trail slots into their existing D3P / recordkeeping arrangements as supplementary evidence. Their reviewer verifies the certificate independently: one command, no account.
“Hospital procurement asks for HIPAA Security Rule evidence on our agent’s data access patterns. We don’t have a clean way to produce it, so we keep answering in prose.”
Per-tool policy enforcement + signed event chain + evidence mapped to HIPAA Security Rule technical safeguards (45 CFR §164.312). Supports your customer’s existing HIPAA compliance program. It does not replace it.
“We’re trying to land a DoD prime. They want continuous evidence of agent action governance for ATO review. Our security packet came back rejected.”
Continuous attestation evidence on top of the Standing Certificate, mapped to NIST AI 600-1 control families. Integrates with the agency’s existing FedRAMP / ATO process. It does not certify FedRAMP itself.
“A vendor sent me an Evidence Packet. How do I verify it independently? I don’t want to trust their cloud, or theirs, or anyone’s.”
Verify in the browser, or run estoppl verify-certificate cert.json. Fetches the issuer’s public key from JWKS, checks the Ed25519 signature offline, returns VALID plus a drill-down summary in under 30 seconds. The algorithm spec is published, so re-implement it in any language you like.
Two ways in, depending on whether you have a deal on the line or an afternoon to poke at a proxy.
Instrument one deployment. Bring the deal it is stuck behind. We stand up the recording with you, and the packet it produces goes into that review, and every review after it.
Full proxy with guardrails, signed audit trail, and local dashboard. Apache 2.0. No account required. Run it against your own agent this afternoon.
npm install -g estopplbrew tap estoppl/tap && brew install estopplRun vendor security reviews? We want to hear the evidence bar you wish every agent vendor met, and what would have to be in a packet for it to actually shorten your review. Tell us what would clear it →
Bring that one. Fifteen minutes with the founder. We look at the questionnaire you were sent and work out what the packet has to contain to answer it.
— Tina Ho, founder · ex-Netflix, ex-Amazon · LinkedIn ↗